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The strength of the not-for-pro￿t sector has long puzzled economists in
the light of the basic assumption that ￿nancial incentives are an important
engine of economic activity in a market economy.1 The existing view of not-
for-pro￿ts is that they are a second-best response to certain types of incentive
problems.2 One set of theories focus on contract failure (Hansmann, 1980)
and argue that the not-for-pro￿t status enables the management to commit
to a higher level of quality or to ensure that donated money or labor will not
be appropriated for private gain (e.g., Easely and O￿ Hara, 1983, Glaeser and
Shleifer, 2001, and Bilodeau and Slivinski, 2004). Another set of theories
(see, Francois, 2000, and 2003) focus on free-riding within a ￿rm and argue
that the not-for-status might be a credible commitment device on the part
of the management to supply less e⁄ort than in a for-pro￿t ￿rm, thereby
inducing greater labor donation from intrinsically motivated workers. Both
sets of theories of not-for-pro￿ts either show or implicitly assume that they
are a welfare-enhancing institution.
In this paper we re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-pro￿ts
based on free-riding, and show that it suggests an alternative, somewhat
darker view of not-for-pro￿ts. The starting point of the labor donation the-
ory is that not-for-pro￿ts tend to be concentrated in activities that have a
public good element, and that volunteering is an important source of labor
in these organizations.3 We show that not-for-pro￿t organizations may exist
in these activities because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the
1A study of 26 countries conducted in the mid 1990s (Salamon et al, 1999), for ex-
ample, found that not-for-pro￿ts employed an average 6.8 percent of the non-agricultural
workforce (12% in the case of the US). Another study of eight OECD countries about a
decade later (Salamon et al, 2007) show that not-for-pro￿ts contributed 8% to the GDP
on average (7.2% in the case of the US).
2See Rose-Ackerman (1996) and Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) for excellent surveys
of the literature.
3Health, education, and social services account for 61% of the contribution of not-for-
pro￿ts to GDP on average in the eight countries studied by Salamon et al (2007). About
half of the 14 million full-time employees in the US not-for-pro￿t sector work on voluntary
basis and volunteer time accounts for about a quarter of not-for-pro￿t contribution to
GDP on average in the seven countries studied by Salamon et al (2007).
2non-pro￿t form more attractive to managers without any concomitant gain
in welfare compared to for-pro￿ts. The choice between not-for-pro￿t and for-
pro￿t provision is therefore not only a question of resolving incentive prob-
lems but also one of distribution of rents between management and workers.
We then proceed to embed the choice of for-pro￿ts vs. not-for-pro￿ts in
a labor market setting where ￿rms and workers match endogenously. We
show that if motivated workers are scarce then competition for them would
lead for-pro￿t ￿rms to drive away not-for-pro￿t ￿rms. We also show that if
managers are su¢ ciently motivated, either ￿nancially or intrinsically, they
will switch to for-pro￿ts. Similarly, if workers are very motivated then man-
agers will prefer for-pro￿ts, the same as if the workers are not motivated at
all.
Our goal is not to argue that not-for-pro￿ts are undesirable but to high-
light a particular e⁄ect that strikes a cautionary note on thinking about
their welfare consequences. The labor donation theory based on free riding
and the theories based on contract failure suggest distinct but not mutually
exclusive mechanisms. In a model that combines both, the negative welfare
results will be mitigated.
Our analysis also highlights the importance of understanding organi-
zational choice between for-pro￿ts and not-for-pro￿ts in a (labor) market
setting and has several empirical implications. For example, it suggests that
the importance of not-for-pro￿ts relative to for-pro￿ts within a sector would
depend on, among other things, the relative scarcity of workers. Also, it
implies that measures of labor market slackness (e.g., the unemployment
rate) might be an important omitted variable to reckon with in studies that
look at the e⁄ect of not-for-pro￿t status on wages and labor donations.
Our paper starts o⁄ with a model of organizational choice similar to
Francois (2003). The basic assumption is that both managers and workers
are intrinsically motivated by the success of the project. E⁄ort by either
of the two leads to a successful outcome and the worker moves ￿rst. This
gives rise to a free-rider problem in the ￿rm, as long as the manager has an
incentive to exert e⁄ort when the worker did not do so yet. The choice of
not-for-pro￿t status by the owner/manager of a ￿rm can then be understood
3as an attempt to resolve the arising free-rider problem within the ￿rm.
Not-for-pro￿t status is chosen because it reduces ￿nancial incentives for
the management and commits it to non-provision of the public good. This
commitment guarantees workers that their individual contribution will make
a di⁄erence in provision and allows managers to reduce the wage payment.
The resulting gain can compensate the manager for lost pro￿ts and makes
the not-for-pro￿t an attractive choice for the manager. In other words, the
not-for-pro￿t status is chosen for projects that are ￿nancially not too ben-
e￿cial because it makes more e⁄ective use of the worker￿ s intrinsic bene￿ts
from public good provision.
However, we show that the adoption of not-for-pro￿t status by the man-
ager increases the burden for the worker. If worker-manager matches arise
endogenously in a labor market, not-for-pro￿t ￿rms can only compete with
for-pro￿t ￿rms when there is an oversupply of motivated labor. If labor is
scarce, not-for-pro￿ts are crowded out. This ￿nding provides a new possible
explanation for the association between volunteer labor and not-for-pro￿t
status, namely, the abundance of motivated labor in some sectors.
If both for-pro￿ts and not-for-pro￿ts are feasible we show that not-for-
pro￿ts are (weakly) dominated by for-pro￿ts in terms of welfare. This result
is even stronger if we introduce some uncertainty and projects can fail with
some probability even if either the worker or the manager supplies e⁄ort.
An important feature of the model is that organizational choice only
a⁄ects the distribution of rents within the ￿rm but not the nature of pro-
duction. We assume that intrinsic motivation is output-based where output
is single-dimensional and there is no second dimension like consumer welfare
or quality. This implies that ￿nancial incentives do not harm consumer or
donor welfare - whoever bene￿ts from the project just cares about project
success. We do not do this because we think it is particularly realistic but
in order to separate out the labor donation theory based on free riding from
the contract failure literature in a clear-cut way.
This article is structured as follows. We discuss the related literature in
greater detail in section 2. Section 3 presents the model in two steps. In
sections 3.1 we lay down the basic framework, and in section 3.2 we analyze
4the case of exogenous matching between workers and managers to derive the
basic mechanism by which not-for-pro￿ts can arise. In section 3.3 we discuss
endogenous matching to show the e⁄ects of labor scarcity on organizational
choice. The welfare implications of not-for-pro￿t provision are discussed in
section 3.4. Section 4 presents an extension. We show that the commitment
of the manager to no e⁄ort via the not-for-pro￿t status is likely to come
with a strict cost in terms of welfare if production has a stochastic element.
Section 5 discusses some empirical implications of our ￿ndings, and section
6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The key idea behind the contract failure literature is that by limiting mone-
tary incentives for owners not-for-pro￿ts enable the managers to commit to
higher quality (e.g., if there is an underlying cost-quality trade-o⁄) and/or
attract key inputs from others (e.g., donations, labor). Hansmann (1980)
provides a brief analysis of the role of not-for-pro￿ts in signalling and screen-
ing managers who vary (unobservably) in terms of how much weight they
put on money versus the output of the organization. Easely and O￿ Hara
(1983) model a society that is interested in maximizing welfare. The basic
con￿ ict in their framework is between the manager of a ￿rm and consumers
of ￿rm output. They show that when output cannot be observed by society
then managers have the incentive to raise their own utility and delivering
less to the consumers. The nondistribution constraint works as a simple
constraint to this behavior.
Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) model the incentives of a manager who
chooses between a for- and not-for-pro￿t setting. They argue that pro￿t
incentives might lead to undesirable outcomes from the point of view of
donors who value the non-contractible outcome of the ￿rm. Their argument
is related to the multi-tasking argument of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991).
Motivating an agent on a contractible task (e⁄ort in increasing output or
reducing costs) might lead to undesirable outcomes because another non-
contractible task (e⁄ort in improving quality) is neglected. They show that
5not-for-pro￿ts remain attractive for managers because the reduced ￿nancial
incentive in the not-for-pro￿t is compensated by the increase in donations.4
A similar argument is made by Bilodeau and Slivinski (2004), who show
that the non-distribution constraint provides the entrepreneur with a means
of committing to not appropriate funds which others wish to assign to the
provision of the public good, and so it induces higher donations by the pub-
lic.
An important recent contribution by Francois (2000) provides a formal
analysis of the theory of labor donations. He starts o⁄ with the premise
that workers are intrinsically motivated in certain activities. He looks at
an environment where there is a problem of moral hazard in teams or free
riding within the organization. He shows that when workers receive intrinsic
motivation from the provision of an output, the ￿rm faces a public good
problem. If the manager is very motivated to provide the output, he needs
to pay the worker a higher wage to motivate e⁄ort because the worker knows
that provision is likely even if he shirks because the manager will step in.
Francois argues that this need to pay higher wages under a for-pro￿t is
the reason why the reduced ￿nancial incentives in the public sector can
be attractive to a social planner, as it would reduce the wage. We follow
the basic argument but show that if the for-pro￿t is feasible it will weakly
increase welfare compared to not-for-pro￿t provision (and strictly so under
some circumstances).
The idea that intrinsic motivation might lead to a wage di⁄erential be-
tween the for- and not-for-pro￿t sector has received a fair amount of at-
tention in empirical work.5 But there are subtle di⁄erences in how a wage
di⁄erential can be interpreted. Francois (2003) argues that workers like to
exert more e⁄ort in not-for-pro￿ts because not-for-pro￿t managers have less
pecuniary incentives to cut costs elsewhere. According to our model, an-
other interpretation is that managers induce workers to accept lower wages
4Vlassopoulos (2009) show that if one introduces reputational mechanisms in the
Glaeser-Shleifer framework, then for-pro￿t status may dominate not-for-pro￿t status.
5See, for example, Mocan and Tekin (2003), Preston (1989), Rose-Ackerman (1996),
and Gregg et al (2008).
6through a commitment to inactivity. This interpretation suggests a gloomier
picture of the not-for-pro￿t status.
While the e⁄ect of competition in output markets on the sectorial mix
has been discussed in the theoretical literature on not-for-pro￿ts6 the ef-
fect of competition for workers on organizational choice remains relatively
unexplored.7 A related paper in this respect is Besley and Ghatak (2005).
In their model, mission oriented managers and workers have an interest to
match with each other because this implies higher output inside the match.
However, their work does not discuss the role of the nondistribution con-
straint in this context. The bene￿ts from motivated agents depend entirely
on the worker/manager match but are independent of the organizational
form. Another related paper is Macchiavello (2008) who study the selec-
tion of motivated workers into the public vs. the private sector and the
ambiguous role that high wage premium in the public sector can play.
3 The Model
3.1 Basic Framework
In this section we present a simple model of organizational choice. A ￿rm
consists of a worker (W) and a manager (M). For now, we take the match
between the worker and the manager to be exogenously given and will con-
sider later the consequences of how they are matched via a labor market.
The worker provides labor and the manager owns an asset that is required
for production. In addition, the manager can intervene in the production
process by allocating additional resources (e⁄ort) once the outcome of worker
e⁄ort is observed. Before production starts, the manager chooses the ￿rm￿ s
organizational form (i.e., choice between for-pro￿t and not-for-pro￿t status),
sets wages, and terms of employment (e.g., the worker can be ￿red in the
case of bad performance). The worker then accepts or rejects the o⁄ered
6See for example Lakdawalla and Philipson (2006).
7See for example Francois (2003) or Rowat and Seabright (2006) who develop argu-
ments around the lower (e¢ ciency) wage in the not-for-pro￿t sector but do not discuss
competition for workers.
7contract. In case she rejects she remains unemployed and the manager
proceeds alone.
Production proceeds as follows. The worker moves ￿rst and chooses
whether to work (eW = 1) or shirk (eW = 0) in the production of ￿rst stage
output (y1), given by y1 = eW. If she exerts e⁄ort she incurs an e⁄ort cost of
1: Both e⁄orts are non-contractible, as in models of moral hazard in teams.
The intermediate output, y1, is observed by the manager but not by any
third party. As a result, either input-based or output-based (or, piece rate)
contracts are not feasible.8 If the project is in danger of failing (y1 = 0) the
manager decides whether he wants to exert e⁄ort (eM = 1) or not (eM = 0):
Second stage output is then determined by his e⁄ort choice: y2 = eM. The
cost of e⁄ort by the manager is c ￿ 1 and will be discussed below in more
detail.9
Project success (max(y1;y2) = 1) yields a ￿nancial return of ￿. In addi-
tion, we assume that manager and worker are intrinsically motivated. Both
derive some utility from the project being successful. In particular, we as-
sume that the output of the project is a public good to the worker and the
manager. They receive a bene￿t of ￿j (j = W;M) from project success
independently of their own e⁄ort and organizational form of the ￿rm.10
As an example, we can think of a research project. If the project is
successful then both the worker (a research assistant, a ￿eld worker, or
a laboratory assistant) and the manager receive a positive non-pecuniary
payo⁄ because it helps society in some way. In addition, there are some
￿nancial bene￿ts which can consist of research grants, salary increases, in-
creased budget for the research group, or money obtained from patenting
the innovation. The worker and the manager both have the skill to provide
8We show in Appendix G that the main trade-o⁄s remain in place when the man-
ager can contract on output. We use e¢ ciency wages for simplicity, relevance as well as
comparability with the existing literature (in particular, Francois, 2000, 2003).
9In this formulation the two types of e⁄ort are substitutes (as in Francois, 2000, and
2003) and this naturally exacerbates the problem of free riding. The results go through
so long as the e⁄orts are not strong complements.
10In the terminology of Francois and Vlassopoulos (2008) we assume output-oriented
altruism as opposed to action-oriented altruism.
8the appropriate labor input but for reasons of comparative advantage the
worker is hired to do it. However, if the worker does not provide it then
the manager has the choice to step in and save the project, or let it fail.
We assume that not-for-pro￿ts are characterized by a non-distribution
constraint, i.e., the manager cannot take home all the pro￿t, ￿, in case of
project success.11 Below we follow the formulation of Glaeser and Shleifer
(2001) of the non-distribution constraint. In particular, we assume that
committing to a non-distribution constraint means that the manager can
still capture some share of the pro￿ts ￿. In their interpretation, the share
1 ￿ ￿ is lost because the manager￿ s technology of capturing some of the
pro￿ts is ine¢ cient (e.g., in the form of perks) - it is equivalent to burning
a fraction 1 ￿ ￿ of the pro￿ts.12
We allow the manager to choose any ￿ 2 [0;1]: A not-for-pro￿t ￿rm
is then de￿ned by ￿ < 1 and a for-pro￿t ￿rm by ￿ = 1. We assume that
the choice of ￿ has no direct costs. Figure 1 summarizes the resulting game
tree for the production process.
Given that the worker￿ s e⁄ort and output is not veri￿able, the manager
can only pay a ￿xed wage, w. Following the e¢ ciency wage literature, we
assume that the manager can motivate the worker by threatening to ￿re
her in case she is caught shirking as in standard e¢ ciency wage models.
Naturally, the worker will have to earn some rents for the ￿ring threats to
have bite. We assume that the worker has no liquid wealth and there is
a limited liability constraint so that the worker￿ s wage cannot be less than
some minimum level (which we assume to be zero for simplicity). Otherwise,
performance bonds or penalties could be used to give additional incentives.
The worker is caught shirking and ￿red with certainty if eW = 0 and never
￿red if eW = 1. Let ￿ ￿ 1 denote the probability of a currently unemployed
worker staying unemployed.13 Since in equilibrium workers do not shirk
11The manager could pay himself a ￿ at wage and if output was constant, he could
appropriate the pro￿ts by setting this wage to be high. If output is variable then he will
not be able to appropriate the surplus with a ￿xed wage.
12See also Hansmann (1980, p. 873-875) for some anecdotal support for this formulation.
Another possible interpretation is that the share (1 ￿ ￿) goes to the bene￿ciaries in some
form. We discuss the welfare outcomes for both scenarios in section 3.4.
13In order to keep the model as simple as possible we assume that this probability is
9and are never ￿red, without loss of generality our analysis will focus on the
one-shot payo⁄s of managers and workers.
Let e￿
W and e￿
M denote the e⁄ort choice of the worker and the manager
that are induced by the choice of ￿ and w via the incentive-compatibility
constraints of the worker and the manager (see below). Let ￿ uM and ￿ uW
be the outside options of the manager and the worker, respectively. The






W (￿￿ + ￿M) + (1 ￿ e￿
W)e￿
M (￿￿ + ￿M ￿ c) ￿ w
subject to the following constraints:
(i) the participation constraint (PC) of the manager:
EU(e￿
W;e￿
M) ￿ ￿ uM;




W + w ￿ ￿ uW;




1 if ￿￿ + ￿M ￿ c
0 otherwise
; (1)






1￿￿ ￿ w + e￿






where ￿ < 1 is a discount factor and ￿ ￿ 1 is the worker￿ s probability of
not a⁄ected by labor market conditions. For the same reason we assume that there is no
noise in the supervision technology, and once employed a worker who does not shirk keeps
his job forever (i.e., there is no chance of exogenous break up of a match).










The manager￿ s ICC in equation (1) states that ￿nancial plus intrinsic
bene￿ts of the project must be higher than the intervention cost c for him
to exert e⁄ort. The worker￿ s ICC is derived in Appendix A. It states that
the worker exerts e⁄ort if the present value of wage and intrinsic bene￿t
from project success minus e⁄ort costs is higher than the present value of
free-riding on manager e⁄ort and being ￿red after one period.
The PCs are given by the expected bene￿ts of the contract (￿;w) chosen
by the manager and the respective outside options of manager and worker.
For simplicity we assume for now that the manager can and will provide the
public good on his own, at cost c. Under this assumption his outside option
is:
￿ uM = ￿ + ￿M ￿ c:
The manager￿ s PC can then be rewritten as
e￿
W (￿￿ + ￿M) ￿ w + (1 ￿ e￿
W)e￿
M (￿￿ + ￿M ￿ c) ￿ ￿ + ￿M ￿ c: (3)
Since the worker has no control rights she is not able to produce anything
outside the ￿rm. In order to keep the model simple we assume that the
worker does not bene￿t from the public good provision of the ￿rm if she
does not work in it which is a reasonable assumption if the output is not
observable outside the ￿rm. The worker￿ s outside option is therefore
￿ uW = 0:
When we allow for endogenous matching, the outside option would be the
best o⁄er made by another organization.




W + w ￿ 0: (4)
Throughout, in order to focus on the interesting cases, we restrict atten-
tion to parameter values that satisfy:
Assumption A1 : ￿ ￿ c ￿ ￿M ￿ 0 :
If A1 is violated the manager is either always committed to no e⁄ort (i.e.,
￿ + ￿M < c) or never committed to no e⁄ort (￿M > c). To keep the
exposition simple, for our basic results we restrict attention to the case
where ￿W ￿ 1, because otherwise the non-negativity constraint on wages
would start binding. We will comment on what happens in the case ￿W > 1
at the end of the following section.
3.2 Organizational Choice
The not-for-pro￿t status comes at the cost of decreased rents to the manager,
but with the bene￿t of lower wages. It will be chosen if the latter outweighs
the former. This section derives necessary and su¢ cient conditions for this
to be the case.
The key to understanding the role of not-for-pro￿ts lies in the manager
ICC, namely, equation (1). The inequality shows that reducing the pro￿t
share ￿ reduces the incentives of the manager to bail out a failing project
because it reduces his ￿nancial bene￿t from project success. In other words,
not-for-pro￿t status can be used to reach commitment vis a vis the worker.
If ￿ is su¢ ciently low in the not-for-pro￿t, the worker knows that her e⁄ort
will be crucial for project success. This ability of the not-for-pro￿t to commit
the manager to no e⁄ort is crucial for its attractiveness from the perspective
of the manager. If A1 is violated the choice of ￿ does not a⁄ect either
the manager￿ s incentives (1) or the worker￿ s incentives (2). Since lowering
￿ from 1 directly reduces the manager￿ s utility, ￿ < 1 is never chosen if the
inequalities in A1 are not ful￿lled.
If A1 if ful￿lled, however, the manager can commit to let the project fail
12(e￿
M = 0) by adopting not-for-pro￿t status. Formally, commitment is reached
if the pro￿t share satis￿es:




The interpretation is, the monetary bene￿t ￿￿ is lower than the costs
over and above what the manager is compensated for by intrinsic motiva-
tion, c ￿ ￿M. The threshold ￿￿ follows immediately from the manager￿ s
ICC, namely, equation (1). It is important to note that in this model the
reduction of ￿nancial incentives has no direct positive e⁄ects (like increased
investments or quality) but only serves as a commitment device for the man-
ager. However, we show below that the advantage of not-for-pro￿t status
for the manager is that it might reduce wage payments.
From the worker￿ s ICC, equation (2), the minimum wage needed to in-
duce worker e⁄ort can be written as:
w(e￿
M) = A(1 ￿ ￿W) + (A ￿ 1)e￿
M￿W (5)
(because we restrict attention to ￿W ￿ 1 the non-negativity constraint never
binds strictly) where
A ￿
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
:
Notice that, as ￿ < 1 and ￿ ￿ 1, A > 1: The interpretation of A is it is the
e¢ ciency wage for a worker who has no intrinsic motivation (￿W = 0). As
the cost of e⁄ort is 1; and the outside option is zero, A has to be greater
than 1 for the agent to receive any rents. The lower is ￿ (more impatient
is the worker) and the lower is ￿ (the easier it is for an unemployed worker
to ￿nd a job), the incentive problem is larger, and so the higher will be A:
Lemma 1 Assume A1 holds. Then not-for-pro￿ts with ￿ ￿ ￿￿ have to pay
a smaller wage to workers to motivate worker e⁄ort (e￿
W = 1) than any ￿rm
with ￿ > ￿￿, in particular, ￿ = 1.
13Proof. For e￿
M = 0 from (5) we get:
w(0) = A(1 ￿ ￿W)
and for e￿
M = 1, it is:
w(1) = A ￿ ￿W:
As A > 1, w(0) < w(1) for all 1 ￿ ￿W ￿ 0: For the lemma to hold we also
have to make sure that the worker￿ s PC, equation (4), is satis￿ed. For a
for-pro￿t, e￿
W = e￿
M = 1 and so the worker￿ s PC is ￿W +w(1) ￿ 1: As A > 1
this is satis￿ed. Similarly, for a not-for-pro￿t, e￿
W = 1 and e￿
M = 0 and so
the worker￿ s PC is ￿W + w(0) ￿ 1, or, A(1 ￿ ￿W) + ￿W ￿ 1: As A > 1,
and ￿W ￿ 1, this is satis￿ed. Now the proof follows from the fact that
non-pro￿ts with ￿ ￿ ￿￿ commit the manager to inactivity (i.e., e￿
M = 0).
Lemma 1 states that the incentive-compatible wage is lower in not-for-
pro￿ts than in for-pro￿ts. The intuition is simple: if the manager is very
motivated he saves the project in case it is about to fail (e￿
M = 1) and the
worker receives ￿W regardless of her e⁄ort level. She is then tempted to free-
ride on the public good provision by the manager and a higher e¢ ciency wage
is needed to motivate her to supply e⁄ort. In the not-for-pro￿t the manager
can reduce the pro￿t share to ￿￿ and commit to e￿
M = 0. This increases
e⁄ort incentives for the worker because the worker now knows that without
her e⁄ort the project will fail.
Henceforth we will refer to w(0) as wNP and w(1) as wFP: Table 1
summarizes the optimal wages and pro￿t share for for-pro￿ts and not-for-
pro￿ts. The optimal pro￿t share in the not-for-pro￿t is ￿￿ because any
further reduction would just reduce the retained pro￿ts of the manager but
would not have any impact on the wage. Table 1 shows that e¢ ciency wages
are reduced by worker intrinsic motivation both in the for and not-for-pro￿t.
However, the wage reduction is higher in the not-for-pro￿t.14
14This is similar to the result in Besley and Ghatak (2005) that motivated workers
are given less high-powered incentive schemes which results in lower expected wages, and
like it, suggests that workers, if possible, would like to conceal their intrinsic motivation.
We abstract from issues of observability of intrinsic motivation (or lack thereof), and
consequently, the role of signalling and screening (see Benabou and Tirole, 2006 and
14Optimal Wage (w) Optimal Pro￿t Share (￿)
for-pro￿t wFP = A ￿ ￿W ￿FP = 1
not-for-pro￿t wNP = A(1 ￿ ￿W) ￿￿ = c￿￿M
￿
Table 1: Optimal Wages and Pro￿t Shares
The payo⁄ of the manager under a not-for-pro￿t is ￿￿￿ + ￿M ￿ wNP
while his payo⁄under a for-pro￿t is ￿+￿M ￿wFP: The PCs of the manager
under these two organizational forms are:
￿￿￿ + ￿M ￿ wNP ￿ ￿ + ￿M ￿ c
and
￿ + ￿M ￿ wFP ￿ ￿ + ￿M ￿ c:
These can be rewritten as:
c ￿ ￿ + ￿M ￿ c + wNP
and
c ￿ wFP:
These conditions are intuitive. They mean that the wage in the not-for-
pro￿t plus the pro￿t lost due to not-for-pro￿t status needs to be smaller
than the e⁄ort cost for the manager in autarchy. In the for-pro￿t the wage
has to be smaller than the manager￿ s cost of e⁄ort. Substituting values of
wNP and wFP these can be simpli￿ed to:
c ￿
￿ + ￿M + A(1 ￿ ￿W)
2
(6)
c ￿ A ￿ ￿W: (7)
Now we turn to characterizing conditions when a not-for-pro￿t will be
Delfgaauw and Dur, 2008)
15chosen. We make the following assumption:




This is a necessary condition for not-for-pro￿ts to satisfy the manager￿ s PC.
If c is too low relative to the project bene￿ts then the manager will never
￿nd it attractive to choose the not-for-pro￿t and will prefer autarchy.
Now we characterize conditions under which the trade-o⁄ between re-
duced ￿nancial return and reduced wages can lead to not-for-pro￿ts being
preferred to for-pro￿ts:
Proposition 1 Assume A1 and A2 hold. The manager prefers the not-for-
pro￿t to a for-pro￿t if and only if
￿W ￿ max
￿
￿ + ￿M ￿ c
A ￿ 1
;1 +




However, workers never prefer the not-for-pro￿t to a for-pro￿t because the
not-for-pro￿t wage is lower.
Proof. See the appendix.
The intuition to the ￿rst part of the proposition is simple. If worker
intrinsic motivation is high, the manager bene￿ts from a not-for-pro￿t be-
cause it reduces wages substantially. The loss of pro￿t from adopting the
not-for-pro￿t status relative to the for-pro￿t status is (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿, which can
be rewritten ￿ + ￿M ￿ c. In other words, not-for-pro￿t status leads to a
bigger loss if the project is very attractive from the manager￿ s point of view.
Therefore, the manager prefers the not-for-pro￿t to the for-pro￿t if his ￿-
nancial and intrinsic bene￿ts from the project are not too high relative to
the intrinsic motivation of the worker.
The worker￿ s preference for the for-pro￿t is surprising given the usual
perception that intrinsically motivated workers prefer not-for-pro￿t ￿rms.
In our model, under both the for-pro￿t and the not-for-pro￿t, the output
is the same but the former pays a higher wage. E⁄ectively, in not-for-pro￿t
16￿rms, the manager free rides on the intrinsically motivated worker.15
This highlights an important di⁄erence to other models in the literature
which derive not-for-pro￿t status from contractual failure vis a vis the bene-
￿ciary. The di⁄erence becomes clear if we re-interpret the worker as a donor.
In our model, the not-for-pro￿t is a commitment device by the manager to
stay inactive if the donor does not donate to the ￿rm. This commitment
increases donations but does not necessarily improve the welfare of the ben-
e￿ciary. If the donor could choose he would donate to a for-pro￿t.
Notice that our result is driven by the fact that managers will produce
the public good even if they do not ￿nd a motivated worker, which is ensured
by Assumption A1: It might seem that this biases the choice against not-
for-pro￿ts. But if A1 does not hold, then not-for-pro￿ts cannot exist as the
manager is either always committed to no e⁄ort or always committed to
supply e⁄ort.
Our framework allows us to examine the e⁄ects of changes in manager
and worker motivation on organizational choice very clearly.
By A1 the existence of a not-for-pro￿t industry generally depends on a
relatively low level of intrinsic bene￿ts ￿M: If ￿M > c, Assumption A1 is
violated and the not-for-pro￿t looses its ability to commit the manager to
no e⁄ort. As a result, for-pro￿ts are always chosen. On the other hand, if
￿M = 0; not-for-pro￿ts can exist so long as the conditions in Proposition
1 are satis￿ed. Also, keeping total pro￿tability (￿ + ￿M) constant, not-for-
pro￿ts are less likely with more motivated managers. We summarize this
as:
Observation 1 The greater is the intrinsic motivation of the manager (￿M)
the less likely not-for-pro￿ts will be the chosen organizational form.
The intuition is simple. Since the key issue is free-riding, if the manager
is very motivated, he cannot commit not to work on the project in case the
worker shirks. But then there is no point in making costly organizational
15This relies on the assumption that the intrinsic motivation ￿W is the same in both
cases. If motivation is not observable then working in a not-for-pro￿t for a low wage could
serve as a signal that one is pro-social (as in Benabou and Tirole, 2006).
17choices in order to try to commit. This provides a theory of the choice
between for-pro￿t social enterprises and not-for-pro￿ts. Social enterprises
can be organized as either for-pro￿ts or not-for-pro￿ts and combine a revenue
generating business with a social value generating component. They pursue
what is often referred to as a double bottom-line which is a combination
of pro￿t and mission-related impact. It is argued that revenue generation
allows social enterprises to be self-sustaining and pro￿ts attract additional
capital to solve social ills.16
Next we turn to worker motivation. Clearly, if workers are unmotivated
(￿W = 0) then not-for-pro￿ts will never be chosen. Proposition 1 shows
that worker motivation will have to exceed some positive threshold for not-
for-pro￿ts to become an attractive option. What happens if workers are
very motivated? Recall that so far we have restricted attention to ￿W ￿ 1
to keep the exposition simple. Suppose A > ￿W > 1. Now wNP = 0 but
wFP = A ￿ ￿W > 0: Therefore, inserting these in the condition for not-for-
pro￿ts to be chosen, i.e., wFP ￿ wNP ￿ ￿ + ￿M ￿ c; we get
￿W ￿ A ￿ (￿ + ￿M ￿ c):
In other words, if the worker is very motivated then for-pro￿ts become at-
tractive relative to not-for-pro￿ts, because the former allows the manager to
bene￿t more from extra worker motivation through lower wages than the lat-
ter, where the wage hits a lower bound. If ￿W > A, then wNP = wFP = 0
and for-pro￿ts will always be chosen. This is intuitive, because the only
reason to choose not-for-pro￿ts in our framework (which is costly to the
manager in the form of having to give up full residual claimancy) is it can
yield lower wages. If both for-pro￿t and not-for-pro￿t wages are equal, then
for-pro￿ts will be preferred. We summarize this as:
Observation 2 If the worker has very low or very high intrinsic motivation
then for-pro￿ts will be preferred by the manager. Not-for-pro￿ts can
arise only for intermediate levels of worker motivation.
16See Martin and Osberg (2007) and Bornstein (2004).
18We will see in the next section that another force that could lead to for-
pro￿ts and not-for-pro￿ts to have equal wages is labor market competition
for motivated workers and this too would lead the former being preferred to
the latter.
So far we assumed that due to a limited liability constraint, the worker
has to be paid non-negative wages. In some settings this may not be a good
assumption. There are instances where volunteers or interns pay a fee to
serve in an organization. Recall that in our model not-for-pro￿t and for-
pro￿t wages are A(1 ￿ ￿W) and A ￿ ￿W respectively. Clearly, for ￿W > 1,
both wages are negative and the former is less than the latter as A > 1.
Observation 3 If there is no limited liability constraint and the worker
can be charged a fee to serve in the organization, not-for-pro￿ts would
charge a higher fee than for-pro￿ts.
Intuitively, both for-pro￿ts and not-for-pro￿ts charge the worker for her
participation in the industry. The worker is willing to pay because unem-
ployment would exclude her from intrinsic bene￿ts derived from the project.
Under a for-pro￿t the manager cannot commit not to supply e⁄ort if the
worker does not, and this means the worker will have to be paid a greater
premium to supply e⁄ort compared to a not-for-pro￿t, which in this case,
translates into a lower fee that the worker can be charged. The not-for-
pro￿t can charge more because it commits the manager to inactivity. An
example might illustrate this point. There is a quickly growing industry of
volunteer tourism which combines typical backpacking trips with develop-
ment work. In this sector, not-for-pro￿t ￿rms provide local development
work for the traveler. Most of the ￿eld work requires only unskilled la-
bor, available in abundance in the local community. Still, volunteers are
intrinsically so motivated that they are willing to pay the organization to
get work. The web-sites organizing the market strongly suggest that the
impact of the volunteer is an important consideration for this willingness to
pay.17 In other words, the labor market features payments from the worker
17Volunteer travel, or "voluntourism" has become quite popular which combines travel
with volunteering for a charitable cause.
19to the organization (a negative wage) in return for the opportunity to make
a di⁄erence.
3.3 Labor Markets and Organizational Choice
This section extends the model derived in the previous section to a labor
market setting where a number of workers and managers match endoge-
nously. The aim of this exercise is to show that labor market conditions
and organizational choice are closely linked, a point that existing theories of
not-for-pro￿ts have ignored.
Assume that there are M managers with intrinsic motivation ￿M ￿ 0,
Nm motivated workers with ￿W > 0 and Nu unmotivated or neutral workers
with ￿W = 0. In what follows we assume that there is some unemployment,
Nu + Nm > M. However, we will allow the degree to which motivated
workers are scarce to vary, i.e., Nm ? M.
At the matching stage managers choose a contract (￿;w) to maximize
their expected utility EU(e￿
W;e￿
M) subject to the PC of themselves and that
of the worker. A stable matching is one where no change of match could
strictly increase a manager￿ s or worker￿ s utility without making the new
matching partner worse o⁄ compared to how she was before. Production
takes place once a stable matching is reached.
A crucial question for the e⁄ect of the labor market on organizational
choice is whether the for-pro￿t organizational form can satisfy the manager￿ s
PC. Assume ￿rst that for-pro￿ts are feasible in the sense that the manager
always prefers to be in a for-pro￿t than to produce alone.
Proposition 2 Assume A1 and that for-pro￿t provision is feasible, i.e.,
c ￿ A ￿ ￿W. If motivated labor is scarce (Nm < M) then not-for-pro￿t
￿rms cannot exist in labor market equilibrium.
Proof. We prove the proposition by contradiction. Assume that there are
some not-for-pro￿ts in a matching equilibrium with Nm < M. First, note
that by Proposition 1 workers prefer to work in for-pro￿ts. As motivated
workers are scarce (Nm < M) there are some managers who are matched
20with an unmotivated worker. These managers will always set up for-pro￿t
￿rms because not-for-pro￿t status does not reduce their wage bill, w =
A. A worker in a not-for-pro￿t ￿rm can therefore improve her position by
replacing an unmotivated worker in a for-pro￿t match. The manager will
accept this swap because he prefers a for-pro￿t match with a motivated
worker to a for-pro￿t match with an unmotivated worker.
An immediate corollary is:
Corollary 1 Assume A1 and that for-pro￿t provision is feasible, c ￿ A ￿
￿W. If motivated workers are abundant (Nm > M) then not-for-pro￿ts can
exist in labor market equilibrium and Proposition 1 applies.
Proposition 2 provides a pessimistic view of not-for-pro￿t ￿rms. It states
that if the adoption of not-for-pro￿t status is motivated by the desire to use
intrinsic motivation of workers to reduce wages then a slack labor market is
a necessary condition for this to be feasible. The reason is simply that given
a choice, workers always want to work for a higher wage. As we showed in
the previous section, the incentive-compatible wage rate is lower in a not-
for-pro￿t than in a for-pro￿t. In a labor surplus situation, not-for-pro￿ts
can therefore exist. But in a labor-scarce situation, only the higher wage
rate is relevant and so not-for-pro￿ts will be crowded out of the market by
for-pro￿ts.
An important insight from this result is that the choice between not-for-
pro￿t and for-pro￿t provision is not always a question of resolving incentive
problems but also one of distribution of rents. In both organizational forms
the worker provides the good at e⁄ort cost of 1. The only di⁄erence is the
wage that the manager has to pay to the worker. From this point of view,
the not-for-pro￿t is a method of redistributing rents towards the manager
of the ￿rm.
Therefore, our analysis suggests that organizational choice would de-
pend on, among other things, the relative scarcity of workers and managers.
If workers are abundant then managers can choose their preferred organi-
zational form as if they were matched exogenously with a worker. Under
A1 and A2 this situation is captured by condition (8). Not-for-pro￿ts are
21chosen when the wage reduction compensates the manager for the reduced
￿nancial gains. Workers have to swallow the resulting reduction in wages
because there is an oversupply of motivated labor.
So far we have compared the not-for-pro￿t status directly with the for-
pro￿t status. The picture changes somewhat if managers prefer working
alone to setting up for-pro￿t ￿rms.





there is a not-for-pro￿t sector if the man-
ager￿ s PC can be satis￿ed in the not-for-pro￿t but not in the for-pro￿t, i.e.
if
A ￿ c ￿ ￿W ￿ 1 +
￿ + ￿M ￿ 2c
A
:
Proof. See the appendix.
According to Proposition 3 not-for-pro￿ts could play a role in industries
that are not attractive to for-pro￿t ￿rms. The reason is that not-for-pro￿ts
lead to a redistribution of rents toward owners of assets and can therefore
make setting up a ￿rm easier. The conditions in the proposition indicate that
not-for-pro￿ts arise as long as the available projects are not too attractive
(both in terms of pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns) for the manager
and for intermediate values of worker intrinsic motivation.
An interesting comparative static result that follows directly from Propo-
sitions 2 and 3 is that, as c rises for-pro￿ts can become feasible, and an indus-
try that produces public goods might change from not-for-pro￿t provision
to for-pro￿t provision. If we interpret c as the level of specialization in the
labor force, not-for-pro￿ts will be most common in industries that combine
high level of worker intrinsic motivation with a low level of specialization.18
18This comparative static is partly supported by a survey among 1900 persons respon-
sible for human resources (HR) in the voluntary sector in England (Clark (2007)). The
study shows that vacancies which require speci￿c skills were most likely to be categorized
as hard to ￿ll by the HR personal. It is not clear, however, whether this was due to general
scarcities or a not-for-pro￿t phenomena.
223.4 Welfare
So far we have focused on the choice between not-for-pro￿ts and for-pro￿ts
from the point of view of the manager. In this section we discuss the welfare
implications. In order to keep the focus on the comparison between not-for-
pro￿ts and for-pro￿ts we assume throughout that the manager￿ s PC does
not bind in any of the two organizational forms.
Before we turn towards the welfare implications, however, we turn to-
wards a brief discussion of ￿rst-best e⁄ort. First-best e⁄ort maximizes total
surplus. For the second stage this implies that the manager should exert
e⁄ort (eM = 1) if y1 = 0 and
￿ + ￿W + ￿M ￿ c ￿ 0
and eM = 0 otherwise. Notice that A1 implies that the above condition
holds. Also, the condition for the worker to exert e⁄ort (eW = 1) in the ￿rst
stage is ￿ + ￿W + ￿M ￿ 1 ￿ 0, and this is implied by the above condition
as by assumption c ￿ 1:
Not-for-pro￿ts commit the manager to no e⁄ort in our model because a
share of pro￿ts (1 ￿ ￿)￿ cannot be captured by him. The ￿rst question is
whether the share of pro￿t that is lost to the manager is a deadweight loss
(as in Glaeser and Shleifer, 2001), because, for example, he consumes it in
the form of perks even though he would have preferred to have it in the form
of cash, or whether it is redistributed towards the bene￿ciary of the project
(as in Easly and O·Hara, 1983). If we assume the former, then choosing
not-for-pro￿ts over for-pro￿ts will always decrease welfare. This is because
the e⁄ort allocation does not change but not-for-pro￿ts waste resources by
making it harder for the manager to capture the pro￿t.
If the pro￿t share (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿ is redistributed and not wasted, both orga-
nizational forms are equivalent in terms of welfare. To see this, note that
all that matters for welfare in this case is who exerts e⁄ort. In both the
for-pro￿t and the not-for-pro￿t the manager pays the worker an e¢ ciency
wage so that the worker does supply e⁄ort, and, therefore, the cost of pro-
duction is one. For-pro￿t and not-for-pro￿t are therefore equivalent in terms
23of welfare. The only di⁄erence between the organizational forms is that the
not-for-pro￿t distributes more of the gains to the manager (and to a third
party) and less to the worker. However, as we will see in the next section,
the equivalence between for- and not-for-pro￿ts depends on our strong as-
sumption that production is non-stochastic and it is su¢ cient for either the
worker or the manager to supply e⁄ort for the project to go through.
4 Extension: Stochastic Project Success
The basic model presented above is based on a particular simplifying as-
sumption removing which will add an extra e⁄ect that will go against the
choice of not-for-pro￿ts. In particular, the assumption that the project
always succeeds in case of worker e⁄ort reduces the welfare loss caused by
manager commitment in the not-for-pro￿t. If projects could fail despite
worker e⁄ort then there is a positive role to be played by an active manager.
To see this, assume that worker and manager e⁄ort lead to project success




1 if h(￿￿ + ￿M) ￿ c
0 otherwise
:
From the ICC we can see immediately that the ￿￿ that commits the





which implies that assumption A1 has to be modi￿ed to
Assumption A3 : ￿ ￿
c
h
￿ ￿M ￿ 0:
We derive the two e¢ ciency wages in the appendix, they are
wNP = A(1 ￿ h￿W)
24for the not-for-pro￿t and
wFP = A(1 ￿ h￿W) + (Ah ￿ 1)h￿W
for the for-pro￿t, where A ￿
1+(1￿￿)￿
￿ as before.
First note, that the for-pro￿t wage can now actually be lower than the
not-for-pro￿t wage if Ah < 1. This is because the worker bene￿ts from being
employed in a company that has a motivated manager even if the worker
exerts e⁄ort himself. If h is relatively small this factor weighs more heavily.
Intuitively, an increasing failure rate 1 ￿ h increases the chance that the
manager has to exert e⁄ort despite worker e⁄ort. This additional bene￿t
is re￿ ected in e¢ ciency wages. In order to make not-for-pro￿t dominance
possible we need to assume that
Assumption A4 : Ah ￿ 1
so that wFP ￿ wNP. For non-negativity of wages it then su¢ ces to assume
that ￿W < 1
h.
We discuss the manager PCs in the appendix. As before, in order for
the not-for-pro￿t to be feasible we need to assume that




Given these assumptions it is still possible that the not-for-pro￿t is cho-
sen by the manager. However, this can only be the case if the wage gains
compensate the manager not only for lost pro￿ts but also for a loss in pro-
ductivity. To see this, note that the manager prefers the not-for-pro￿t if
h(￿￿￿ + ￿M) ￿ wNP
￿ h(￿ + ￿M) ￿ wFP + (1 ￿ h)[h(￿ + ￿M) ￿ c]:
where the third term on the right-hand side represents the productivity
bene￿t for the manager. If the project is about to fail (with probability
1￿h) the manager in the for-pro￿t can intervene. The following proposition
25then characterizes the conditions under which not-for-pro￿ts will be chosen:
Proposition 4 Assume that A3, A4 and A5 hold. The manager prefers the














Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 4 follows proposition 1 closely in the intuition. It states
that not-for-pro￿ts can be preferred if worker intrinsic motivation is large
compared to the bene￿ts of project success.
The e¢ ciency gain in the for-pro￿t also makes for-pro￿t status more at-
tractive to the worker because the average provision rate is higher under that
organizational form. Hence, for-pro￿ts dominate not-for-pro￿ts in terms of
welfare even if the not-for-pro￿t does not waste resources (i.e., the fraction
1￿￿￿ goes to third parties). To see this note that welfare under a for-pro￿t
is higher if
h(￿ + ￿M + ￿W) ￿ 1 + (1 ￿ h)(h(￿ + ￿M + ￿W) ￿ c)
> h(￿ + ￿M + ￿W) ￿ 1
where the left-hand-side displays welfare under a for-pro￿t and the right-
hand side is the welfare under a not-for-pro￿t. By assumption A2 this is
always satis￿ed because h(￿ + ￿M + ￿W) > c.
In summary, our analysis above o⁄ers an interesting insight concerning
the choice of not-for-pro￿t status. Even if not-for-pro￿ts may yield lower
expected surplus than for-pro￿ts, they might be chosen because of the rent
extraction (i.e., paying the worker low wages) vs. e¢ ciency trade-o⁄ that
the manager faces. Even if it is socially e¢ cient for both the worker and the
manager to supply e⁄ort, the manager might want to tie his hands behind
his back and commit not to supply e⁄ort if the need arises, in order to relax
the worker￿ s ICC.
265 Discussion
Our analysis suggests that organizational choice between for-pro￿ts and not-
for-pro￿ts would depend on, among other things, the relative scarcity of
workers and managers. In particular, the abundance of motivated labor in
some sectors may lead to the rise of not-for-pro￿t organizations. Figure 2
provides a crude look at the existing cross-country evidence regarding the
connection between not-for-pro￿t (paid) employment and unemployment
rates.19 For comparability we only focus on OECD countries. The graph
shows a suggestive pattern with respect to groups of countries. Countries
with very low unemployment rates (Sweden, Norway, Japan and Finland)
also feature the least employment in not-for-pro￿t ￿rms. Most European
continental countries as well as Australia, the US and UK feature both
higher unemployment rates and higher not-for-pro￿t employment. This
pattern is only broken by Spain and Italy which feature both higher un-
employment and low not-for-pro￿t involvement.20 Clearly we cannot infer
anything causal from this correlation, but it does suggest that with richer
data macroeconomic factors such as unemployment rates (as well as institu-
tional factors like the regulatory regime) might be useful in understanding
the prevalence of not-for-pro￿ts. Our argument is, for example, consistent
with some of the data presented in Mocan and Tekin (2003). Their evidence
on worker selection show that weak labor market participants like Blacks
and Hispanics are overrepresented in not-for-pro￿ts. While this could be
driven by factors such as not-for-pro￿ts are less likely to discriminate, it is
also consistent with our model.
More generally, our ￿nding that labor market conditions a⁄ect organiza-
tional choice is relevant for empirical analysis as it suggests that measures
of labor market slackness (for speci￿c worker characteristics) might be an
important omitted variable in studies that look at the e⁄ect of not-for-pro￿t
status on wages and labor donations. For example, unemployment is most
19Not-for-pro￿t employment data (1991-1996) is from Salamon (1999). Unemployment
rates (1990) are from the the CIA World Factbook.
20Dropping the three countries with double-digit unemployment makes the correlation
signi￿cant at 5% level.
27likely correlated with typical dependent variables like wages (negative cor-
relation) and labor donations (positive correlation) and might therefore bias
the coe¢ cient on not-for-pro￿t status upwards.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-pro￿ts
based on free-riding developed by Francois (2000, 2003). We embed the
choice of for-pro￿ts vs. not-for-pro￿ts in a labor market setting where ￿rms
and workers match endogenously. We show that motivated workers are bet-
ter o⁄ working in a for-pro￿t ￿rm compared to a not-for-pro￿t ￿rm. We
show that if ￿rms had to compete for workers not-for-pro￿t ￿rms would be
competed out by for-pro￿t ￿rms. As a result we conclude that the reason
for the existence of not-for-pro￿t organizations may be because of the excess
supply of motivated workers that make the non-pro￿t form more attractive
to managers. We also show that, assuming both organizational forms are
feasible, for-pro￿ts welfare dominate not-for-pro￿ts, and strictly so, if pro-
duction involves some uncertainty.
7 Appendix
A E¢ ciency Wage
The worker is assumed to be in￿nitely lived. If the worker is employed and
exerts e⁄ort, she is not ￿red, and receives the present value of
E = ￿W + w ￿ 1 + ￿E
=
￿W + w ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
:
We assume here that the worker is ￿red with certainty if she shirks and
remains unemployed with probability ￿ once she is in that state. Unem-
ployment bene￿ts are normalized to 0. Also, we assume that workers do
not observe any activity within ￿rms if they are unemployed, in particular,
28whether or not the public good is provided, and who supplies the e⁄ort.21
Therefore, if unemployed, the worker earns a present value of
U = 0 + ￿ (￿U + (1 ￿ ￿)E):
This simpli￿es to
U =




￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿￿
￿W + w ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
where we inserted the present value of employment with e⁄ort.
If the worker shirks she is caught with certainty, and her present value
of utility is
S = w + e￿
M￿W + ￿U:
The dependence on e￿
M re￿ ects the assumption that the manager cannot
immediately replace a worker if she is ￿red, and will have to supply e⁄ort
himself for that period.
The worker exerts e⁄ort if
E ￿ S
or
￿W + w ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
￿ w + e￿
M￿W + ￿2(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿￿
￿W + w ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
Equation (2) follows immediately.
B Proof of Proposition 1
The manager prefers the not-for-pro￿t to a for-pro￿t if
￿￿￿ + ￿M ￿ wNP ￿ ￿ + ￿M ￿ wFP:
21This is similar to what Francois (2003) assumes. The results do not change qualita-
tively if we allow the unemployed workers to continue to receive utility from public goods
provided in the ￿rms from which they got ￿red.
29Given A1, ￿￿ lies between zero and 1. Inserting ￿￿ = c￿￿M
￿ and re-
arranging, we get:
wFP ￿ wNP ￿ ￿ + ￿M ￿ c:
Inserting wFP and wNP we get:
A ￿ ￿W ￿ A(1 ￿ ￿W) ￿ ￿ + ￿M ￿ c
or
￿W ￿
￿ + ￿M ￿ c
A ￿ 1
:
Also, the condition for not-for-pro￿ts to satisfy the manager￿ s PC is, rewrit-
ing (6):
￿W ￿ 1 +
￿ + ￿M ￿ 2c
A
:
Given A2 this condition is consistent with ￿W ￿ 1: The above two conditions
can be combined as (8). The worker prefers the not-for-pro￿t if
￿W + wNP > ￿W + wFP
which, given Lemma 1 is never the case. This completes the proof.
C Proof of Proposition 3
The relevant choice for the manager is between working alone and setting up
a not-for-pro￿t. Therefore, the relevant condition combines the condition
for a not-for-pro￿t to be chosen over autarchy, and for-pro￿ts not satisfying
the manager￿ s PC, i.e., rewriting inequalities (6) and (7) in terms of ￿W and
combining them.
D Wages with Stochastic Success
With e⁄ort the worker￿ s utility is
30E = h￿W + (1 ￿ h)p￿W + w ￿ 1 + ￿E
=
h￿W + (1 ￿ h)p￿W + w ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
:
The unemployed worker has an expected utility of
U = 0 + ￿ (￿U + (1 ￿ ￿)E)
=
￿ (1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿￿
h￿W + (1 ￿ h)p￿W + w ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
:
If the worker shirks her present value of utility is
S = w + p￿W + ￿U:
The worker exerts e⁄ort if
E ￿ S
or
h￿W + (1 ￿ h)p￿W + w ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
￿ w+p￿W+￿2(1 ￿ ￿)
1 ￿ ￿￿
h￿W + (1 ￿ h)p￿W + w ￿ 1
1 ￿ ￿
:
Simplifying, and solving for w we get:
w ￿
￿
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
￿￿








Therefore, the wage in the not-for-pro￿t is:
w ￿ A(1 ￿ h￿W):
In the for-pro￿t, it is:
w ￿ A
￿








31which simpli￿es to the condition given in the text.
E Manager PCs with Stochastic Success
The manager￿ s PC in the for-pro￿t is
h(￿ + ￿M) ￿ wFP + (1 ￿ h)(h(￿ + ￿M) ￿ c) ￿ h(￿ + ￿M) ￿ c
or
c ￿
h(1 ￿ h)(￿ + ￿M) + A ￿ (A(1 ￿ h) + 1)h￿W
h
:
In the not-for-pro￿t, it is:
h(￿￿￿ + ￿M) ￿ wNP ￿ h(￿ + ￿M) ￿ c
or
c ￿
h(￿ + ￿M) + A(1 ￿ h￿W)
2
:






F Proof of Proposition 4
The proof for Proposition 4 is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. The
condition for the not-for-pro￿t is preferred is:
h(￿￿￿ + ￿M) ￿ wNP






32and the wages, we get:
c ￿
￿




￿ h(￿ + ￿M) ￿
￿
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
￿￿








+(1 ￿ h)(h(￿ + ￿M) ￿ c):






(h(￿ + ￿M) ￿ c):
The PC of the manager in the not-for-pro￿t is:
h(￿￿￿ + ￿M) ￿ wNP ￿ h(￿ + ￿M) ￿ c:
This can be rewritten as:











G Continuous E⁄ort and Incentive Schemes
We show here that our key results are not driven by either our assumption of
continuous e⁄ort nor our assumptions about contractibility. Let us assume
that intermediate output in contractible so that a wage can be paid that is
contingent on it.
We assume, as before, that manager and worker move consecutively.
First the worker chooses eW 2 [0;1] then, after observing project success or
failure, the manager chooses eM 2 [0;1]. The probability of project success






where cW = 1 and cM = c ￿ 1.
Bene￿ts from project success are similar to the case of discrete e⁄ort.








in the second stage. We will have an interior solution if ￿￿+￿M
c ￿ 1 or,
￿ ￿ c￿￿M
￿ : If ￿￿+￿M
c > 1, a reduction in ￿ has no e⁄ect on manager e⁄ort.
In order to keep the analysis simple we therefore assume an interior solution.
A su¢ cient condition for this is c > ￿ + ￿M:
The worker maximizes






which has the following ￿rst-order-condition
e￿
W = w + (1 ￿ e￿
M)￿W:
Note, that this is exactly the e⁄ort crowding out we also observed in
the previous worker ICC. Put di⁄erently, the not-for-pro￿t status increases












In order to show that a reduction in ￿ reduces wages we have to solve
for the optimal wage. Write manager expected utility
EUM = e￿










after plugging in e￿
W and e￿




























and the ￿rst order condition for the wage yields
w =
























For not-for-pro￿ts to be ever chosen, we must have ￿w
￿￿ > 0 at ￿ = 1: This
is the case if:
￿W > ￿ + ￿M ￿ c
which follows directly from the su¢ cient condition for an interior solution
for the manager￿ s choice of e⁄ort.
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Figure 1: Game TreeFigure 2:Not-for-profit employment and unemployment rates in OECD countries